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is to compensate the taxpayer for the cost of his asset, but for
no more. As expressed by Mr. Justice Clark, "Congress intended
by the depreciation allowance not to make taxpayers a profit
thereby, but merely to protect them from a loss.''38 In light of
this consideration the taxpayer could have prevailed only by
showing that he was clearly entitled to the tax saving.
These decisions indicate that the Commissioner has succeeded
in his attempt to have the law applied as it was probably in-
tended. The depreciation of an asset which is normally held
for its full economic life will not be affected, but only those
which are sold while they have a substantial resale value. If
any relief is to be forthcoming for the businesses which have lost
these tax advantages, it apparently must come through congres-
sional action.
Peyton Moore
MINERAL RIGHTS -EFFECT OF FORCED UNITIZATION WITH
PRODUCING ACREAGE SUBSEQUENT TO PRIMARY TERM
UNDER LEASE CONTAINING COMMENCE DRILLING
AND CONTINUOUS DRILLING CLAUSES
Plaintiff, a Texas resident, sued, in an action removed to fed-
eral district court, to have his mineral lease on certain Louisiana
lands declared superior to defendant's lease. Defendant's lease,
executed on a standard printed form,' contained the customary
sixty-day continuous drilling clause2 and the customary thirty-
day commence drilling clause.8 Defendant was engaged in drill-
ing operations at the expiration of the primary term but
38. Ibid.
1. Bath Louisiana Special 14-BR 1, M. L. Bath Co., Shreveport, La.
2. Ibid: "5. If prior to discovery of oil, gas, sulphur or other mineral on said
land, lessee should drill a dry hole or holes, thereon, or if after discovery of oil,
gas, sulphur or other mineral, the production thereof should cease from any cause,
this lease shall not terminate if the lessee commences operations for additional
drilling or reworking within sixty days thereafter or (if it be within the primary
term) commences additional drilling operations or commences or resumes the
payment or tender of rentals on or before the rental paying date next ensuing
after the expiration of three months from date of completion of dry hole or
cessation of production. .. ."
3. Ibid. "5. . . . If at the expiration of the primary term, oil, gas or other
mineral is not being produced on said land but lessee is then engaged in drilling
or reworking operations thereon, the lease shall remain in force so long as opera-
tions are prosecuted with no cessation of more than thirty (30) consecutive
days, and if they result in the production of oil, gas or other mineral, iso long
thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is produced from said land. . .
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abandoned his efforts two days later, having completed a dry
hole. Thirty-two days thereafter, defendant obtained an order
from the Commissioner of Conservation unitizing a portion of
the leased premises with adjacent land upon which there was a
producing well. Subsequent to issuance of the order, plaintiff
obtained a second lease on the land, and in the instant action de-
manded a share of production from the unit. On plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment, held, denied. Since the lessee
was engaged in drilling at the expiration of primary term, the
lease was continued in force by terms of the commence drilling
clause until completion of the dry hole. The continuous drilling
clause then became operative, allowing the lessee sixty days
from completion of the dry hole to commence additional drilling
or reworking operations. As the court construed defendant's
lease, production from the unit created by the Commissioner's
order issued during that sixty-day period substituted for the
lessee's obligation to drill and served to continue the lease, even
though a portion of the land included was in production prior to
creation of the unit. Harper v. Hudson Gas & Oil Corp., 189 F.
Supp. 781 (W.D. La. 1960).
The drilling paragraph of a typical oil and gas lease contains
two clauses governing the legal relations of the parties in the
event the lessee completes a dry hole. One of these clauses,
known technically as the "continuous drilling clause" but re-
ferred to in the industry as the "sixty-day clause," provides that
should the lessee complete a dry hole, he is given sixty days to
commence additional drilling or reworking operations on the
lease. 4 In the "commence drilling" or "thirty-day" clause, it is
anticipated that the lessee might be engaged in drilling opera-
tions at the expiration of the primary term, subsequently com-
pleting a dry hole. In that event, the thirty-day clause allows
him to continue working or reworking operations on that partic-
ular well so long as there is no cessation of operations for more
than thirty continuous days. In short, the sixty-day clause al-
lows the lessee sixty days to regroup and drill at a different loca-
tion, while the thirty-day clause allows him to carry to comple
tion the particular operation in which he is engaged at the ex-
piration of the primary term. Both clauses afford the lessee an
opportunity fully to develop the lease, but require him to do so
without unreasonable delay.5
4. Under a "drill or pay" lease, it is customary to suspend the requirement
of delay rentals during this period. See note 2 supra.
5. See Discussion Notes, 7 Om. & GAs REP. 1512 (1957).
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Courts in other jurisdictions have held that a lease contain-
ing typical thirty- and sixty-day clauses is continued by produc-
tion from drilling operations begun within sixty days after com-
pletion of a dry hole in process at the expiration of primary
term.6 In these decisions it was necessary to give cumulative
effect to the clauses - the thirty-day clause carrying the lease
in force beyond primary term until completion of the dry hole,
and the sixty-day clause constituting authority to engage in addi-
tional drilling operations within the ensuing sixty days. The
cumulative effect of these clauses has not been tested before a
Louisiana court.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has held uniformly that under
leases permitting the lessee to unitize, production from the unit
substitutes for the lessee's obligations to drill even though the
producing well is not located upon that particular leasehold.7
Recently the court has said:
"The rule is too well established in our jurisprudence to
require citation that the drilling and production of oil from
a unitized area constitutes an exercise and user of the min-
eral rights throughout the entire unit and operates as a sub-
stitute for performance of drilling obligations contained in
a mineral lease covering any property or tract located within
the unit.""
The reasons behind this policy are obvious. Lessor and lessee
have a common objective, to obtain maximum production from
the land. If such production can be realized without the expense,
delay, and inconvenience of a drilling operation on the particular
leasehold, neither party should be heard to complain. Accord-
6. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Newman Bros. Drilling Co., 157 Tex. 489, 305
S.W.2d 169 (1957), 56 MiCe. L REv. 823 (1958); St. Louis Royalty Co. v.
Continental Oil Co., 193 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1952). The latter case rested on an
alternative holding of estoppel. Of. Skelly Oil Co. v. Wickham, 202 F.2d 442
(10th Cir. 1953), where a lease did not contain a sixty-day clause or its equivalent.
It was held that the thirty-day clause did not contain authority for the lessee to
commence additional drilling operations subsequent to primary term, though the
lease was held in force, by the particular drilling operations underway at the
expiration of primary term, until the dry hole was completed. See also Rogers v.
Osborn, 152 Tex. 540, 261 S.W.2d 311 (1953), where cumulation of the thirty-
and sixty-day clauses was urged, but it was determined that a dry hole had not
in fact been drilled. For a general discussion of these cases, see Sperling,
Habendum Clause as Affected by Shut-in, Commence Drilling, Continued Drilling
and Other Clauses, in 9 INsTiTUT ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TA XATION 1, 21
(1958).
7. The leading case on this point is Hardy v. Union Producing Co., 207 La.
137, 20 So.2d 734 (1944).
8. Delatte v. Woods, 232 La. 341, 385, 94 So.2d 281, 287 (1957).
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ingly, most lease forms contain provisions authorizing the lessee
to unitize at his option.9 However, in the lease agreements con-
strued in Wilcox v. Shell Oil Co.10 and Mallet v. Union Oil Co.,"
the Supreme Court refused to find authority for the lessees to
continue their leases by unitizing with land already in produc-
tion. In both instances, the lessees attempted to preserve their
leases in the twilight hours by entering into voluntary unitiza-
tion agreements attaching the leases to tracts, also leased by
them, on which production had already been obtained. The Wil-
cox lease provided that:
"[T]he commencement of a well or the completion of a
well to production, and production of oil or gas therefrom on
any portion of an operating unit in which all or any part of
the land described herein is embraced, shall have the same
effect, under the terms of this lease, as if a well were com-
menced or completed on the land embraced by this lease."'-'
The court interpreted this language as applicable only to produc-
tion obtained subsequent to the creation of the unit. The court
interpreted the pooling paragraph of the Mallet lease as permit-
ting unitization solely for the purposes of "future development,"
thus not empowering the lessee to unitize with land already de-
veloped. As
9. See Discussion Notes, 7 OIL & GAS REP. 1512 (1957). In the instant
lease, the pooling paragraph read in part: "6. If at any time while this lease
is in force and effect lessee in its opinion deems it advisable and expedient, in
order to form a drilling unit or units to conform to regular or special spacing
rules issued by the Commissioner of Conservation of the State of Louisiana, or
by any other State or Federal authority having control of such matters, or in
order to conform to conditions imposed upon the issuance of drilling permits,
lessee shall have the right, at its option, to pool or combine the lands covered
by this lease or leases in the immediate vicinity thereof, whether such land, lease
or leases are held by lessee or by others, such pooling to be into a unit or units
not exceeding the number of acres, or the land subdivisions whichever may be
the larger, allocated to one well by the above mentioned authority or authorities,
and to be applicable only to such lands, horizons or strata as are covered by
such regulations. . . . As between the parties hereto and except as herein other-
wise specifically provided, the entire acreage so pooled into a tract or unit shall
be treated for all purposes as if it were included in this lease. . . .Drilling opera-
tions on or production of oil, gas, sulphur or other minerals from any portion of
the land covered hereby shall continue this lease in force and effect during or
after the primary term as to all the lands covered hereby, irrespective of whether
any portion thereof has been pooled. If operations be conducted or production
be secured from land in such pooled unit other than land covered by this lease,
it shall have the same effect as to maintaining lessee's rights in force hereunder
as if such operations were on or such production from land covered hereby, except
that its effect shall be limited to the land covered hereby which is included in
such pooled unit.
10. 226 La. 417, 76 So.2d 416 (1954).
11. 232 La. 157, 94 So.2d 16 (1957).
12. 226 La. 417, 425, 76 So.2d 416, 420 (1954).
13. "It appears throughout the lease that it contemplates the development of
1961] NOTES
In the instant case, both parties conceded that the thirty-
and sixty-day clauses cumulated to continue the lease for sixty
days following completion of the dry hole. Nevertheless, the
court felt constrained to treat the cumulation of these clauses
at length, perhaps because the question of cumulation was res
nova to Louisiana jurisprudence. The court adopted the rea-
soning of the Texas Supreme Court in Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.
v. Newman Bros. Drilling Co.1 4 wherein thirty- and sixty-day
clauses identical to those in the instant lease were held to have
cumulative effect.15 The remaining question was whether the
establishment by the Commissioner of Conservation of a drilling
unit within the sixty-day period, including a portion of the
leased premises with a producing well located on another section
the property by drilling thereon and we find throughout the lease references made
to the drilling or reworking operations; production of oil and gas; and com-
mencing drilling operations. In paragraph 4 we find this language, after reference
is made to the right to pool, viz.: 'when in Lessee's judgment it is necessary or
advisable to do so in order properly to develop and operate said leased premises.'
In the same paragraph of the lease it is to be noted that the phrase 'drilling or
reworking operations thereon and production' are used.
"In paragraph 5 this language is used: 'If operations for drilling are not
commenced on the land covered hereby or on land with which land covered hereby
is pooled hereunder, as above provided.'
"In paragraph 6 we find this language, 'this lease shall not terminate if
Lessee commences or resumes drilling operations or reworking operations.'
"In paragraph 9 we find this language: 'After the production of oil, gas,
sulphur or other mineral has been secured from the land covered hereby or land
pooled therewith.'
"In paragraph 11 we find, viz.: 'Should Lessee be prevented from complying
with any express or implied covenant of this lease from conducting drilling or
reworking operations,' etc.
"The language used in this lease unmistakably shows that the pooling agree-
ment was authorized only for the purpose of development and the right to unitize
with producing property was not granted. The whole tenor of the lease and the
pooling agreement contemplates pooling before production." 232 La. 157, 164, 94
So.2d 16, 18 (1957).
Justice McCaleb's dissent rested on language also found in the pooling para-
graph giving the lessee the option to unitize when " 'in the judgment of the lessee
[unitization would] promote the conservation of oil and gas from said premises.' "
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 165, 194 So.2d at 19.
14. 157 Tex. 489, 305 S.W.2d 169 (1957).
15. "The sixty-day clause deals only with two fact situations: (1) where a
dry hole or holes are drilled prior to the discovery of oil or gas, and (2) where
after discovery of oil or gas production ceases from any cause. The sentence pro-
vides that in either of the two fact situations, the lease may be kept in force by
additional drilling or reworking operations begun within sixty days or (if it be
within the primary term) by resumption of payment of delay rentals within a
stipulated time. The lessee is specifically given the right to keep the lease alive
by resuming payment of rentals in either situation provided it occurs before the
end of the primary term. By necessary implication the lease may be kept in force
by the additional drilling or reworking operations in either fact situation whether
occurring within or after the end of the primary term.
"Although the clause stipulates that the lease will not terminate, it was not
included simply to insure that the drilling of a dry hole or cessation of production
would not be grounds for forfeiture of the lessee's estate. If this were its only
purpose, it could be effective only at a time when the lease is, and would other-
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of land, maintained the lease thereafter.'6 Plaintiff argued that
only actual drilling or reworking on the leased premises could
have continued the lease. In support of this position he cited
several cases holding that the power to unitize is to be strictly
construed. The court rejected these cases as inapplicable since
the express language of the pooling paragraph authorized the
lessee to unitize at his option "at any time the lease is in full
force and effect." It reasoned that through cumulation of the
thirty- and sixty-day clauses, the lease was in force and effect
on the date the Commissioner's order was issued. 1'7  Alterna-
tively, plaintiff contended that even if the power to unitize were
operative on that date, the lessee was not authorized to unitize
with land upon which there was already a producing well, citing
as authority the Wilcox and Mallet cases, discussed above. The
court distinguished these cases on the ground that they involved
voluntary unitization agreements, while in the instant case, the
unit was created by order of the Conservation Commissioner.
However, if this distinction were not controlling, said the court,
the intent of the lessor to authorize unitization with land in
production was sufficiently clear from the language of the agree-
ment. The pooling paragraph provided that the lease would be
continued by "drilling operations or production" from any of
wise remain, in full force and effect under its other provisions, i.e., during the
primary term. The parenthetical expression shows beyond any question that the
parties contemplated that the provision would be effective both during and after
such term. Its primary purpose is to give a lessee who has incurred the expense
of drilling a well an opportunity to save his lease in the event the well is a dry
hole or production ceases after having been obtained. The effect of the provision
then, once it becomes operative and lessee begins additional operations within the
stipulated time, is to keep the lease alive as long as the additional drilling or
reworking operations, and any production resulting therefrom continue.
"There is nothing in the lease to suggest that the sixty-day clause will not
be effective if the particular operation begun during the primary term results in a
dry hole. Even though the dry hole results from drilling which was going on at
the end of the primary term or there is a cessation of production which kept the
lease alive after the end of such term, the parties have agreed that the lease may
be kept in force by additional drilling or reworking operations begin within sixty
days, but only in the two fact situations mentioned." 157 Tex. 489, 496, 305
S.W.2d 169, 174 (1957).
16. As the court framed the issue, "[I]f additional drilling or reworking opera-
tions were not begun during that additional period of time, the lease would have
expired, unless it was maintained by some other provision of the agreement."
189 F. Supp. 781, 788 (W.D. La. 1960).
17. Plaintiff also contended that an agreement extending the lease "for a
period of sixty (60) days from April 4, 1955, and so long thereafter as oil, gas
or other minerals is produced therefrom," obtained by defendant before he com-
menced his sole drilling operation on the land, had the effect of superseding the
original habendum clause and thus requiring that actual drilling on the lease was
necessary to carry beyond primary term. The court rejected this argument on the
basis of other language in the extension agreement to the effect that all provi-
sions of the original lease were kept in force, save the length of the primary
term.
NOTES
the land in the unit.'8 Had the parties intended to limit the
authority to unitize solely with land not yet producing at the
time the unit was created, they would have used the conjunctive
language, "drilling and production from any portion of the land
in the unit will constitute production sufficient to continue the
lease."' 9
From the phraseology of the drilling paragraph of the in-
stant lease, it appears that possible cumulation of the thirty-
and sixty-day clauses was not contemplated by the parties.
Most probably, the thirty-day clause was inserted to protect
the lessee's investment in a particular drilling operation at the
expiration of primary term, from which particular well pro-
duction might afterwards be obtained. The sixty-day clause,
as it relates to dry holes, was probably inserted to allow a tem-
porary abatement of delay rentals during the primary term while
the lessee prepared to drill an additional well elsewhere on the
leasehold. 2° It is equally unlikely that the parties anticipated
that the lessee would have occasion to unitize a portion of the
lease with land already in production. Though the instant de-
cision may cause parties negotiating new leases to provide ex-
pressly for these eventualities, its major import rests upon the
interpretation of lease provisions currently binding on parties
who likewise may have failed to take these possibilities into
account. From the standpoint of logic and fairness, the position
taken by the court is entirely defensible. Defendant oil com-
pany had expended large sums of money in drilling on the lease
only to discover data indicating that oil thereunder could be
drained adequately by its well already producing on an adjacent
tract. Defendant was instrumental in obtaining the unitization
order and most probably bore the costs. By contrast, plaintiff's
interest was not acquired until after the order was issued, and
though he contributed nothing to the enterprise, he demanded
the profit from defendant's expenditures.
18. See note 9 supra.
19. Compare with the following from Justice McCaleb's dissent in Mallet v.
Union Oil Co., 232 La. 157, 167, 94 So.2d 16, 19 (1957) : "Counsel point to the
conjunction 'and' . . . and argues that drilling and production is essential in order
for the unitization of the leased property to become effective. This is true but it
does not restrict in any manner the time when the unit may be formed or warrant
the conclusion that unitization must take place prior to drilling and production."
20. It will be noted that the sixty-day clause of the instant lease provided for
sixty additional days to drill after cessation of production, as well as sixty addi-
tional days after completion of a dry hole. See note 2 supra. Perhaps reference
in the drilling paragraph to the operation of the sixty-day clause subsequent to
primary term contemplated only a cessation of production after primary term and
not the completion of a dry hole.
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The Louisiana Supreme Court, holding against the lessee in
Wilcox v. Shell Oil Co.,21 implied its disapproval of attempts to
preserve the lease in its eleventh hour by unitizing voluntarily
with land on which the lessee had already completed a pro-
ducing well.2 2 Mallet v. Union Oil Co.2 3 was to the same effect.
However, the court in the instant case did not consider those
decisions to be controlling because the creation of the present
unit was "forced" by an order of the Conservation Commis-
sioner. The court observed approvingly that the lessee first
drilled on the leased premises, and, having completed a dry hole,
took prudent steps to protect what he could of his investment.
Perhaps the courts in these three cases reacted to the demands
of the various lessees in the same manner the lessors would have
reacted at the time the leases were negotiated. It is unlikely
that the Wilcox and Mallet lessors (or defendant's lessor) would
have consented to a provision expressly authorizing the lessee
to continue the lease indefinitely simply by unitizing at will with
his own producing acreage. On the other hand, it is probable
that defendant's lessor (and the Mallet and Wilcox lessors)
would not have objected to a provision allowing the lease to be
preserved by "forced" unitization with producing land, with the
understanding that to obtain the unitization order, the lessee
would be required to satisfy the Commissioner of Conservation
that, on the basis of geological data, a unit should be created in
the interests of conservation.
Gerald LeVan
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE To
ALTER MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES
Petitioners, Negro residents of the City of Tuskegee, Ala-
bama, sued in federal district court seeking a declaration that an
act of the Alabama legislature, redefining the boundaries of the
21. 226 La. 417, 76 So.2d 416 (1954).
22. "In order to keep the Wilcox lease alive ... Shell was faced, as the rental
date . . . approached, with the alternative of commencing drilling on the Wilcox
land or paying the delay rental. To avoid both of these alternatives, Shell formed
an operating unit in an attempt to cause production from the FT sand to be
considered production under the Wilcox lease. This was very much to its interest
because by it Shell could save a rental payment of $2,750 and at the same time
avoid the expense of drilling a well on the Wilcox lease within the 12 months
remaining of the primary term in an effort to keep it alive beyond that term."
Id. at 423, 76 So.2d at 418.
23. 232 La. 157, 94 So.2d 16 (1957).
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